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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that product differentiation is compatible with perfect competition under free entry and 
exit and small firm size relative to size of market.  Despite Chamberlin’s view, monopolistic competitors are price 
takers, even though each firm’s product has no perfect substitute.  There is a difference between perfect 
competition with product homogeneity and perfect competition with differentiated products, however.  
Advertising can pay off with differentiated products because products have separate identities—and price depends 
on quality—even though firms are price takers for any given quality.  A differentiated oligopoly may resemble 
monopolistic competition a la Chamberlin in some ways. 
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PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND DEMAND ELASTICITY  
 
 
 
This paper argues that product differentiation is compatible with perfect competition under free entry and 
exit and small firm size relative to size of market.  Under the conditions given by Chamberlin [1965] in his classic 
treatise on monopolistic competition, firms would be price takers and perfect competition would prevail, although 
with a key exception relating to advertising.  Similar results have been derived before—for example, by Fradera 
[1986] and Rosen [1974]—but the approach here is simpler, shorter, and freer of restrictive assumptions.  It 
focuses on the key issue of demand elasticity.  Despite the widespread view in economics that monopolistic 
competitors face downward-sloping demand and produce with excess capacity and sub-optimal firm size, the 
existence of many imperfect substitutes for a product is enough to turn its supplier into a price taker.  For an 
industry to have these properties, we need a number of competitors that is not so large that each firm is a de facto 
price taker, but also not so small that firms are able to earn positive economic profit. 
To show that firms facing many competitors are price takers, I first note that monopolistic competition 
implies many firms in an industry—the result of free entry and exit and large market size relative to the output 
that minimizes average cost for any firm.  Each firm supplies a single product, and as in perfect competition, has 
an insignificant share of industry output.  Buyers of these products are assumed to maximize utility.  Firms 
maximize profit and reach a Nash equilibrium, in which no firm can gain profit by changing its price if prices of 
other firms remain unchanged.  Marginal costs and prices are positive for firms that survive.  Firms supply 
products that are ‘close’ but not perfect substitutes, the factor that distinguishes monopolistic from perfect 
competition.  Product Y is defined to be a ‘close’ substitute for product X if and only if the cross-price elasticity 
between the two that arises when the price of X changes, with other prices held constant, is greater than or equal 
to some positive lower bound.  Otherwise X does not really compete with Y. 
Let X be a differentiated product in an industry called the X industry that operates under monopolistic 
competition.  Let Px and x be the price and quantity of X and x be the own-price elasticity of demand for X.  
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Suppose that Px changes by dPx, with all other prices in the economy remaining constant.  If dPx/Px is numerically 
small, x approximately equals dx/x divided by (dPx/Px), where dx is the change in quantity demanded of X.  Let 
I* be the income of the economy in which the X industry operates and Ex be the expenditure on all products that 
are neither substitutes for nor complements with X.  If I = I*  Ex, I is the sum of expenditures on X and on 
products that are either substitutes for or complements with X.  The economy is assumed to be large enough that 
I* is independent of changes in Px and, by definition, Ex is unaffected by such changes.  Thus I remains constant 
when Px changes.   
However, a change in Px does cause changes in x and in each other output in I.  Let Sx = Pxx/I be the share 
of X in I, and when Px changes with other prices held constant, let Ax be the share-weighted average cross-price 
elasticity of demand over the products that are substitutes for and complements with X.  Each product’s cross-
price elasticity equals the percentage change in its quantity divided by the percentage change in Px.  The shares in 
question are the shares in I of expenditures on each substitute and complement, and the sum of these shares equals 
(1 Sx), while the sum of each share times that product’s cross-price elasticity equals (1 Sx)Ax.  Straightforward 
calculation yields Sx(1 x) + (1 Sx)Ax = 0, since a change in Px does not affect I.  Re-arranging this gives: 
 x = 1 + [(1 Sx)/Sx]Ax.                                                                                                                           (1). 
 Suppose that only a few firms are competing in the X industry initially and earning positive economic 
profits, but that these profits attract further entry until equilibrium is reached with zero economic profits.  In the 
process, Sx tends to zero, and (1 Sx)/Sx tends to infinity.  At the end of the paper, we shall ask how small Sx has 
to be in practice for a firm to be a price taker.  Now the task is to show that as Sx tends to zero, x tends to 
infinity.  Here the key is to show first that, as Sx tends to zero, either Ax remains bounded above zero or x tends 
to infinity.  However, if Ax remains bounded above zero as Sx tends to zero—that is, if there exists a B > 0 such 
that Ax ≥ B—it is clear that x also tends to infinity as Sx tends to zero. 
 To show the first result, let Ix be total expenditure on the X industry, as well as X industry output value, 
and let Inx be the total expenditure on substitutes for and complements with X that are not in the X industry.  
Thus I = Ix + Inx.  If S
x
x = Pxx/Ix is the share of X in Ix, then S
x
x = Sx(I/Ix) ≥ Sx, with the strict inequality holding 
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when Inx > 0.  When S
x
x tends to zero, the same will be true of Sx.  Here Ax is a sum of terms, each of which 
equals the share of a product in I times that product’s cross-price elasticity divided by (1 Sx).  The cross-price 
elasticity equals the percentage change in the product’s output divided by the percentage change in Px.  We can 
write Ax as Ax = xAx  nxAx where xAx is this sum over all products in the X industry except X, and nxAx is this 
sum over products that are substitutes for or complements with X, but which are outside the X industry.   
 As entry into the X industry occurs, consider what happens to dIx/Ix when Px falls, with prices of other 
products held constant.  First note that as Sxx and Sx tend to zero, either x tends to infinity or x remains finite, in 
which case dx/x is bounded relative to (dPx/Px) for all dPx sufficiently close to zero.  Suppose that the latter is 
true.  Then dIx/Pxx is bounded above since the fall in Px causes quantities demanded of substitute products to 
fall.  That is, if dx/x ≤ A(dPx/Px) for some finite and positive A, dIx/Pxx < (1 – A)(dPx/Px) must hold.   
 In addition, dIx/Pxx is bounded below if the fall in Px is sufficiently small.  Otherwise, as S
x
x tends to 
zero, dIx/Pxx will tend to minus infinity for any given small decrease in Px, and dIx/Pxx will therefore tend to 
minus infinity as Sxx and dPx tend to zero.  Suppose that dIx/Pxx is a continuous function of S
x
x and of dPx 
everywhere in some neighborhood of Sxx = dPx = 0.  Then if dPx = 0 and S
x
x is small enough, dIx will be 
negative.  With no changes in prices or incomes, a transfer of demand will occur from products in the X industry 
to products outside this industry.  However, if buyers were already maximizing utility, there would be no need 
for such a transfer.  Thus the assumptions of utility maximization and of continuity imply that dIx/Pxx remains 
bounded below as Sxx and Sx tend to zero. 
 Since dIx/Ix = S
x
x[dIx/Pxx] and dIx/Pxx is bounded above and below, dIx/Ix tends to zero as S
x
x and Sx tend 
to zero.  If Inx tends to zero, note that nxAx also tends to zero—since in the limit there are no complements with 
or substitutes for X outside the X industry—and Ax tends to xAx.  If Inx is positive in the limit, then dInx/Inx tends 
to zero, since in the limit:                                                                                                                           
 0 = dI/I = (Ix/I)(dIx/Ix) + (Inx/I)(dInx/Inx) = (Inx/I)(dInx/Inx)                                                                         (2).  
when Px falls.  However, (dInx/Inx) divided by (dPx/Px) tends to nxAx(I/Inx).  Therefore, as Sxx and Sx tend to zero, 
nxAx also tends to zero if dx/x remains bounded relative to (dPx/Px).  As a result, Ax again tends to xAx. 
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 The final step is to show that x tends to infinity when Ax tends to xAx.  By assumption, all products in 
the X industry are ‘close’ substitutes for X.  The cross-price elasticity between X and any other product in the X 
industry that arises when Px changes cannot be arbitrarily small, but must instead be no less than some positive 
value, say B > 0.  As a weighted average of these cross-price elasticities, xAx must tend to a value that is no less 
than B as Sxx and Sx tend to zero.  Since Ax tends to xAx, the same must be true of Ax.  As a result, x tends to 
infinity, which is therefore the only possible limiting value for x.  By making Sxx and Sx small enough, x can be 
made as large as desired. 
 In fact, the ‘X industry’ is a construct defined to consist of X and of all products that are ‘close’ 
substitutes for X, in the sense that each of the relevant cross-price elasticities when Px changes is no less than B.  
The definition of the ‘X-industry’ will depend on the value of B selected, but the values of x, Sx, and Ax are 
clearly independent of B.  To a degree, the choice of B is arbitrary, but the choice of industry boundaries is 
always somewhat arbitrary.  For the selected value of B, suppose that the set of all ‘close’ substitutes for X 
forms an equivalence class.  That is, suppose that when product X is a ‘close’ substitute for product Y, then Y is 
a ‘close’ substitute for X, and that when X is a ‘close’ substitute for Y and Y is a ‘close’ substitute for Z, then X 
is also a ‘close’ substitute for Z.  In this case, the X industry consists of all firms whose products are ‘close’ 
substitutes for X, which implies that these products are all ‘close’ substitutes for one another as well.  Each firm 
in the X industry so defined is a price taker when the industry consists of many products, with each firm having 
a small share of industry output value.  However, we do not need to assume that the set of all ‘close’ substitutes 
for X forms an equivalence class to show that the supplier of X is a price taker. 
 How small does Sx have to be in order for the supplier of X to be a de facto price taker?  Suppose that Sx 
= .03 and Ax = .3.  If the difference between Ax and xAx can be ignored—since one tends to the other—Ax is 
the share-weighted average cross-price elasticity over the X industry, which would be infinitely large if all 
products in this industry were perfect substitutes.  With Ax = .3, a 10% decrease in Px would lower the demand 
of an average competitor by 3%.  If Ix is 70% of I for the value of B selected, the share, S
x
x, of X in Ix is about 
1.43Sx = .0429, implying an industry with 23 suppliers if S
x
x is an average share for this industry.  In this case, x 
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= 9.7.  If the supplier of X raised its price by 5%, it would lose nearly half its market.  Such a firm has little 
room for price maneuver and is a de facto price taker.  
 However, if Sx were twice as large and Ix were again 70% of I, the share, S
x
x, of X in X industry output 
value would be .0858, implying an industry with 11 or 12 suppliers if Sxx is about average for this industry.  
Then x equals 4.7, and the industry is a differentiated oligopoly.  Nevertheless, if firms in this industry are 
unable to earn positive economic profit, the industry may behave in some ways like a monopolistically 
competitive industry in Chamberlin.  For this behavior, we need a number of competitors that is not so large 
that each firm is a de facto price taker, but also not so small that firms are able to earn positive economic profit. 
 It follows that Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition with many competitors is a type of perfect 
competition, although with a key exception.  When products are differentiated, they and the firms that supply 
them have separate identities and can be distinguished from one another.  It is therefore possible to advertise a 
specific firm’s product successfully if the advertising leads potential customers to believe that it has a higher 
quality than they had previously perceived.  For that quality, the firm is still a price taker, however. 
 While market failure can always result from too few competitors and entry barriers, it does not result 
from product differentiation with many competitors.  Chamberlin’s conclusion that the demand for X is 
downward sloping requires the share-weighted average cross-price elasticity, Ax, to tend to zero as the share of 
X in I tends to zero, but either this does not happen or x tends to infinity anyway. 
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